In a generic setting subsuming communication networks, resource sharing systems, and multi-agent communities, a client generates objects of various classes carrying class-dependent signatures, to which a server assigns class-dependent service quality. A Fake VIP attack consists in false declaration of a high class, with an awareness that detection of object signature at the server side is costly and so invoked reluctantly. We show that such attacks can be mitigated by a server-side double-blind repu-tation scheme. We offer a minimum-information framework for Fake VIP attacks and a stochastic analysis of a two-player Stackelberg game to find optimum attack and defense strategies, as well as to identify regions of operation where both the client and the server find the reputation scheme beneficial.
Authors
Additional information
- DOI
- Digital Object Identifier link open in new tab 10.1109/atnac.2017.8215385
- Category
- Aktywność konferencyjna
- Type
- materiały konferencyjne indeksowane w Web of Science
- Language
- angielski
- Publication year
- 2017
