In IEEE 802.11 networks, selfish stations can pursue a better quality of service through selfish MAC-layer attacks. Such attacks are easy to perform, secure routing protocols do not prevent them, and their detection may be complex. Two-hop relay topologies allow a new angle of attack: a selfish relay can tamper with either source traffic, transit traffic, or both. We consider the applicability of selfish attacks and their variants in the two-hop relay topology, quantify their impact, and study defense measures.
Authors
- dr hab. inż. Jerzy Konorski link open in new tab ,
- Szymon Szott
Additional information
- DOI
- Digital Object Identifier link open in new tab 10.1109/lwc.2018.2809726
- Category
- Publikacja w czasopiśmie
- Type
- publikacja w in. zagranicznym czasopiśmie naukowym (tylko język obcy)
- Language
- angielski
- Publication year
- 2018
