In wireless networks, stations can improve their received quality of service (QoS) by handling packets of source flows with higher priority. Additionally, in cooperative relay networks, the relays can handle transit flows with lower priority. We use game theory to model a two-hop relay network where each of the two involved stations can commit such selfish QoS manipulation. We design and evaluate a reputation-based incentive scheme called RISC2WIN, whereby a trusted third party (e.g., an access point) can limit selfish behavior and preserve appropriate QoS for both stations.
Authors
- dr hab. inż. Jerzy Konorski link open in new tab ,
- dr hab. inż. Szymon Szott
Additional information
- DOI
- Digital Object Identifier link open in new tab 10.1109/glocom.2018.8647988
- Category
- Aktywność konferencyjna
- Type
- publikacja w wydawnictwie zbiorowym recenzowanym (także w materiałach konferencyjnych)
- Language
- angielski
- Publication year
- 2018
