A reputation system for MANETs is described that attempts to deduce nodal trustworthiness (forwarding behaviour) from observed end-to-end path performance. The trustworthiness deduction algorithm produces interval estimates and works well if node misbehaviour is not selec-tive with respect to traversing paths. Nodal reputation levels are next calculated in the spirit of generous tit-for-tat so as to best reflect momentary nodal trustworthiness. High-reputed sources are favoured when forwarding transit pack-ets (indirect reciprocity) and high-reputed paths are fa-voured by the multipath DSR. For a simplified network model and assuming the nodes are able to control their repu-tation levels with a view of a high source throughput, we find that high reputation may be costly to maintain. We examine an arising reputation game and conditions under which it produces a cooperation-stimulating Nash equilibrium.
Autorzy
Informacje dodatkowe
- DOI
- Cyfrowy identyfikator dokumentu elektronicznego link otwiera się w nowej karcie 10.1109/wmnc.2015.42
- Kategoria
- Aktywność konferencyjna
- Typ
- materiały konferencyjne indeksowane w Web of Science
- Język
- angielski
- Rok wydania
- 2015
